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TORT LAW-Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress in the Marital Context:
Hakkila v. Hakkila
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hakkila v. Hakkila,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals for the

first time confronted the issue of the propriety of an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress brought within a divorce proceeding.
Although the court refused to permit recovery in this case, it recognized

infliction of emotional distress brought within a
the tort of intentional
2
marital setting.

II.

3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 29, 1975, E. Arnold Hakkila and Peggy J. Hakkila were
married. Throughout the marriage, Mr. Hakkila assaulted and battered
Mrs. Hakkila. On one occasion, he locked her out of the house overnight.
He insulted her publicly and demeaned her through remarks regarding
her sexuality and competence. Mr. Hakkila also 4refused to engage in

normal marital sexual activity with Mrs. Hakkila.

In February 1985, the couple permanently separated. One month later,
Mr. Hakkila filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Mrs. Hakkila
counterclaimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district
court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage and ruled in favor
of Mrs. Hakkila on the tort claim. 5 On appeal, the court of appeals
reversed the district court's award for the tort claim. 6 The court of
appeals held that the husband's conduct lacked the outrageousness required
to establish liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 7 On
June 4, 1991, the of New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari.'

1. 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575 (1991).
2. Id.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72 for a discussion of the appellate court's possible
adoption of two versions of facts. Without a reversal of the district court's findings of fact, Judge
Hartz possibly developed a different set of facts upon which he based his ruling.
4. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 173, 812 P.2d at 1321.
5. Id. The district court found that the "[wife's] emotional and mental health, especially since
the parties' separation, has been shown to have been characterized by acute depression and one
psychotic episode." Id. One psychologist diagnosed the wife "as subject to a borderline personality
disorder pre-dating the parties' marriage." Id. Another psychologist diagnosed her as "an intellectualizing personality in the early years of her marriage and as suffering from acute depression since
approximately 1981." Id.
6. Id. at 173, 812 P.2d at 1321. The district court also awarded the wife $26,587.70 for attorney's
fees in the divorce proceeding. Id. On appeal, the court held that there was an insufficient amount
of evidence of misconduct in the litigation that could justify the amount awarded and remanded
the issue of attorney's fees. Id.
7. Id. at 179, 812 P.2d at 575.
8. Id. N.M. at 77, 811 P.2d at 575 (1991).
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DISCUSSION

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in New Mexico
In 1972, the New Mexico Court of Appeals first recognized the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Mantz v. Follingstad,9
the court discussed the legal theory of intentional infliction of severe
mental suffering or anguish. The plaintiff-patient in Mantz filed claims
against defendant physician for assault, battery, and negligent medical
malpractice.' 0 Although the plaintiff stated a legal theory of intentional
infliction of severe mental suffering or anguish in the pre-trial order, the
district court refused to submit the theory to the jury. The patient
appealed."
The court of appeals began its discussion of this new tort theory by
referring to the state of Oregon's recognition of this tort. 2 In Rockhill
v. Pollard,3 a patient sued a doctor for outrageous conduct which caused
her severe emotional distress.' 4 The Supreme Court of Oregon adopted
the position of the Restatement of Torts on intentional infliction of
emotional distress which states: "(1) One who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."' 5
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in Mantz, recognized the Restatement's version of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
but found no facts which proved that the defendant intentionally engaged
in extreme and outrageous conduct which caused severe emotional distress
to the plaintiff. 16 Thus, the court held that the district court properly
refused to submit instructions to the jury on this theory.' 7 Despite a
denial of liability on that particular party's claim, the court of appeals
introduced the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress into
New Mexico law.'"

A.

B.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Situations Recognized
in New Mexico

New Mexico has taken a cautious approach in applying the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by permitting recovery of the
claim only under a limited number of circumstances. In Richardson v.
9. 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1972).
10. Id. at 476, 505 P.2d at 71.
11. Id. at 479-80, 505 P.2d at 74-75.
12. Id. at 479, 505 P.2d at 74.
13. 485 P.2d 28 (Or. 1971).
14. Id. Plaintiff, her ten month old daughter, and her mother-in-law were injured in an automobile
accident. Defendant, the treating physician, failed to examine plaintiff and her mother-in-law, despite
visible physical injuries. Defendant also failed to examine the child adequately. In addition to
defendant's overall rudeness, he subjected the three patients to sub-zero temperatures when he
refused to allow them to wait in his office for a ride. Id. at 29-30.
15. Id. at 29 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
16. Mantz, 84 N.M. at 480, 505 P.2d at 75.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Rutherford,19 a ranch owner filed suit against the ranch manager and
his family. The manager's wife counterclaimed for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, assault, and false imprisonment, claiming that she
and her husband were forced to enter into a debt settlement agreement
and forced to live in their car because the owner ejected them from the
ranch. The court awarded the wife compensatory and punitive damages.
However, the damages were unspecified as to whether they were awarded
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, or false imprisonment. 20 In Trujillo v. Puro,2' a patient sued her doctor for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, claiming that the doctor intentionally
made false entries into hospital records. 22 The court of appeals denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, thus
recognizing her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as valid. 23
In several cases, New Mexico courts (and courts applying New Mexico
law) have refused to equate a defendant's conduct with extreme and
outrageous conduct. For example, in Dominguez v. Stone, 24 the defendant
made derogatory statements to the plaintiff during a public meeting and
asserted that plaintiff was not qualified for her position as director of
the town's senior citizen program because she was a Mexican. 25 In Salazar
v. Furrs, Inc.,26 defendant terminated the employment of a pregnant
employee just short of the vesting of her pension benefits based upon
her marriage to a competitor's employee. 27 In Newberry v. Allied Stores,
Inc. ,28 the employer's agent terminated plaintiff for dishonesty and shouted
in the presence of customers that he did not trust plaintiff. 29 In Sanders
v. Lutz, 30 the defendant provoked the plaintiff in their dispute over an
easement despite the defendant's alleged knowledge of plaintiff's stress
disorder. 3 ' In none of these case was outrageous conduct found. These
cases illustrate that, although intentional infliction of emotional distress
is a recognized tort theory in New Mexico, the courts have refused to
apply it liberally, thereby greatly limiting its scope.
C. Analysis
Prior to Hakkila, New Mexico had never recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress within a marital context. The
court followed a logical path of New Mexico law and addressed policy
concerns in order to reach its conclusion that the tort of intentional

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

109 N.M. 495, 787 P.2d 414 (1990).
Id. at 496-97, 787 P.2d at 415-16.
101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 362, 683 P.2d 44 (1984).
Id. at 413-14, 683 P.2d at 968-69.
Id. at 414, 683 P.2d at 969.
97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981).
Id.at 212, 638 P.2d at 424.
629 F. Supp. 1403 (D.N.M. 1986).
Id. at 1406.
108 N.M. 424, 773 P.2d 1231 (1989).
Id. at 429, 773 P.2d at 1236.
109 N.M. 193, 784 P.2d 12 (1989).
Id. at 194, 196, 784 P.2d at 13, 15.
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infliction of emotional distress brought 32in a marital setting, although
barred in New Mexico.

restricted, is not
Other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue have failed to come
to a consensus in their positions. 33 Neighboring states, such as Texas and
Colorado, have adopted the position that the existence of a marital
relationship does not preclude one spouse from bringing a suit for intentional infliction of emotional harm against the other. 4 Some jurisdictions confronted with this issue have refused to recognize the tort by
setting the threshold of outrageousness so high as to bar all suits.35 The
Hakkila court
acknowledged that this issue has produced a split of
6
3

authority.

Hakkila presented a case of first impression in New Mexico which

required the court either to recognize or reject the emotional distress tort
in a marital setting.37 The court successfully sought a compromise between
the two extremes by refusing to bar all suits, yet limiting the scope of
the tort. The court wisely handled the standard to be applied, yet may
have created confusion by including two variant statements of the facts
of this case in its application of the facts to the standard. While identifying
policy concerns restricting the tort in this context, the court, possibly
unintentionally, failed to address adequately the strong policy in support

of the recognition of the tort in this context. Yet, the court sufficiently
discussed the problem confronted when joining a no-fault divorce pro-

ceeding with an action for an intentional tort and suggested that a solution

to this dilemma is bifurcation of the claims.3"

1. Standard
The Hakkila court initially reviewed the law of intentional infliction
of emotional distress outside of the marital context. New Mexico has
attempted to clarify the "extreme and outrageous" element of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In Sanders v. Lutz,3 9 the supreme court

32. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 175-77, 812 P.2d at 1323-25.
33. Id. at 181, 812 P.2d at 1329.
34. See Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (court allowed spouse to
bring a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress but required bifurcation of
the tort claim and the marriage dissolution); Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (court held that interspousal tort immunity did not bar a separate cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress in a divorce suit and refused to follow Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d
127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), which barred a spouse from bringing an action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress in a divorce proceeding).
35. See Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (court concluded that
ordinary fraud and adultery can never rise to the level of outrageousness required for the tort);
Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1989) (court held that an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress can not be maintained when predicated upon the conduct which led
to the dissolution of the marriage).
36. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 178, 812 P.2d at 1326.
37. Id. at 175, 812 P.2d at 1323.
38. Id. at 178, 181-82, 812 P.2d at 1326, 1329-30.
39. 109 N.M. 193, 784 P.2d 12 (1989).
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looked to Mantz and the Restatement
of Torts for guidance in defining
"extreme and outrageous." 4 The court stated that in order to recover
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show
that defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous as well as done
with the intent to cause severe emotional distress. 4' The court used the
Restatement of Torts to define extreme and outrageous conduct as "beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable as a civilized community.' '42
Next, the Hakkila court identified policy restrictions on the liability
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress outside of the
marital context. 4 3 The court acknowledged that intentionally causing emotional harm to another may be justified under certain circumstances"4
and that protected liberty interests preclude otherwise tortious conduct
from being actionable. 45 Finally, the court emphasized that requiring that
the conduct be extreme and outrageous provides for a greater likelihood
that the injury and causation elements of the tort will be met.4
Prior to the application of any tort to the marital context, the ability
of a spouse to initiate such an action must be addressed. In 1973, New
Mexico abolished interspousal immunity for intentional torts in Flores
v. Flores.47 In Flores, a wife brought an action against her husband for
intentionally wounding her with a knife." The Flores court began its
analysis by stating that New Mexico has no statute which precludes one
spouse from bringing suit against the other.4 9 The court then went on
to hold that one spouse is not immune from liability for torts intentionally
committed against the other.50
In the 1975 case of Maestas v. Overton,5 the New Mexico Supreme
Court abolished interspousal immunity for negligently inflicted torts. The
court found no reason to distinguish between interspousal torts intentionally inflicted and those negligently inflicted.5 2 Thus, New Mexico

40. Id. at 196, 784 P.2d at 15.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
43. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324.
44. Id. Debt collection, cross-examination at trial, and basic training are examples of intentional
conduct which causes emotional distress to another, yet is justified. Id. (quoting Daniel Givelber,
The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42, 57 (1982)).
45. Id. Protected liberty interests include expressing unflattering opinions of others which cause
emotional distress. Id. (quoting William Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 44 (1956)).
Likewise, engaging in an extramarital relationship is protected on the basis of liberty interests. Cf.
Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
46. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324. Confirmation of each element is the basis of
the court's concern. If the .conduct does in fact meet the threshold standard, then it will likely also
meet these other two elements of the tort.
47. 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1973).
48. Id. at 602, 506 P.2d at 346.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 603-04, 506 P.2d at 347-48.
51. 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975).
52. Id. at 214, 531 P.2d at 948.
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provides no immunity from tort liability between spouses for personal
torts intentionally or negligently inflicted.5 3
Despite the reaffirmation that spousal immunity is abolished, the Hakkila court identified additional concerns which warrant restrictions on
the application of the tort to the marital context.5 4 Unfortunately, intentional conduct of a spouse which may cause emotional distress to the
other is prevalent in our society." Additionally, the bulk of conduct
within a marriage is privileged.5 6 Not only is interspousal conduct often
is in many
acceptable despite its destructive impact, but this conduct
57
cases considered private and protected from disclosure.
The court distinguished the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress within a marital context from other torts that one spouse may
bring against the other. 5 For example, an action for battery or a suit
for an automobile accident is unlikely to require an inquiry into personal
marital matters.5 9 Yet an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against a spouse will invade marital privacy.6 Furthermore, the
causation element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
is extremely difficult to prove because the underlying conduct of the tort
is often privileged .6 1 In other interspousal tort actions, the causal connection is not as difficult to meet. 62 Lastly, the scope of the tort within
a marital context warrants limitations due to the public policy which
adoption of no-fault divorce on the grounds
accompanied New 6Mexico's
3
of incompatibility.
Despite some courts' recognition of the emotional distress tort within
a marriage, they have failed to articulate a clear standard for liability.6
New Mexico is no exception to this failure. New Mexico precedent
illustrates that courts have been reluctant to define clearly what constitutes

53. Id.
54. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176-77, 812 P.2d at 1324-25.
55. Id. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324. The court recognized that marriages are a common place for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Spouses often argue and one spouse may perceive the
other's conduct as reaching the level of extreme and outrageous when in actuality it is not of this
degree. Id.
56. Id. at 177, 812 P.2d at 1325. A spouse's entitlement to engage in free and open communication
within a marriage is evidenced by statutory protection from requiring disclosure of this communication
if one spouse is a witness in a proceeding. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
57. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 177, 812 P.2d at 1325.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The difficulty of proving the causal connection in an intramarital action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is contrasted with the manageable task of connecting the underlying
conduct of battery of a spouse and the harm inflicted. Id. In the battery case, the physical injury
may be evident. Yet in the emotional distress case, it may be difficult to determine the cause of
the emotional trauma suffered. For example, the emotional injury may have resulted either from
the conduct at issue or merely from the divorce itself.
63. Id. at 178, 812 P.2d at 1326 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989)); see
also infra text accompanying notes 75-83.
64. Constance Ward Cole, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Among Family Members,
61 DENY. U. L. REV. 553, 562 (1984).
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extreme and outrageous conduct. 65 It may be dangerous and unwise to
define precisely terms which are more functional if left ambiguous.
Pinpointing a definition for extreme and outrageous may broaden or
narrow the scope of the tort too much. Whether the facts of a case
reach the level of extreme and outrageous must be determined on a caseby-case basis." Thus, the Hakkila court's failure to articulate clearly a
standard which would provide guidance for subsequent cases may have
been purposeful, adhering to the New Mexico precedents in the area of
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Hakkila court recognized the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress brought within a divorce proceeding yet precluded
recovery in that case. 67 An explanation of the court's refusal to deem
the husband's conduct extreme and outrageous may lie in the fact that
the court looked not at one set of facts, but at two. In the opinion,
the court reprinted some of the district court's findings. 6 The court then
reprinted portions of evidence from the record on which the district court
based its finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 69
The court essentially took the trial court's findings of fact and diminished their impact. For example, the district court found that "[Husband] on occasions throughout the marriage and continuing until the
separation[:] a. assaulted and battered the [wife]." ' 70 Judge Hartz then
reprinted the evidence supporting this finding as summarized in the
husband's brief-in-chief: "In late 1984, when wife was pushing her ' finger
7
in husband's chest, he grabbed her wrist and twisted it severely. '
The court then concluded, contrary to the district court's conclusion,
that the facts of this case did not reach the level of extreme and outrageous
conduct. Yet the inclusion of the two versions of facts creates confusion
as to which set of facts the court used. If the court used the trial court's
findings of facts, as it should have, critics may suggest that denying
recovery was inappropriate. Yet if the court based its ruling upon the
version of facts as developed in the husband's brief and as Judge Hartz
district court's
reprinted, it did so improperly without reversing the
72
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.

65. See supra text accompanying notes 19-31 for a discussion on New Mexico's treatment of
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rather than giving a precise definition to
"extreme and outrageous," the courts have developed a case-by-case approach.
66. Id.
67. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 179, 812 P.2d at 1327.
68. Id. at 173, 812 P.2d at 1321. The court began by stating: "Finding No. 22 summarized
husband's intentional misconduct .... " Id.
69. Id. at 174, 812 P.2d at 1322. The court stated:
The evidence supporting the various findings is summarized in husband's brief-inchief. Because the summaries are not challenged in the answer brief, we have not
independently listened to the multitude of tape recordings of the hearing to check
the accuracy of the summaries.
Id. at 174 n.1, 812 P.2d at 1322 n.l.
70. Id. at 173, 812 P.2d at 1321.
71. Id. at 174, 812 P.2d at 1322.
72. N.M. R. Crv. P. 52(B). New Mexico courts have construed the rule to allow an appellate
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Reservations in recognizing this tort within the marital context may
be justified by the policy concerns articulated by the court. Courts are
generally more willing to condemn intrafamilial physical abuse than emotional abuse. 73 The Hakkila court sufficiently addressed concerns which
warrant restrictions on the tort as applied in this context. Yet the court
may have failed to give an equal voice to the countervailing policy concerns
which preclude courts from shielding a spouse from liability for harm
intentionally inflicted upon the other. For example, Judge Hartz listed
a
the need to protect the privacy interests of the accused spouse as 74
justification for limiting the scope of the tort in marital contexts.
Although fully acknowledging the privacy right of the accused spouse,
Judge Hartz failed to acknowledge the right of the abused spouse to use
tort law to protect herself from abuse. The court would have benefitted
from a more compassionate approach to the topic due to the sensitivity
of an action brought by one spouse against the other.
2. No-Fault Divorce/Community Property
Additional policy concerns justifying a reluctant recognition of the
emotional distress tort brought within a divorce proceeding find root in
the adoption of New Mexico's no-fault divorce and community property
law. 75 Historically, divorce was grounded in some form of fault on behalf
of one or both partners of the marriage. 76 In 1933, New Mexico was
the first state to adopt incompatibility as a ground for divorce. 77 Today,
New Mexico's statute lists incompatibility first as a ground for dissolution
of a marriage.

78

Although incompatibility is identified as a ground for divorce, actually
defining the term is difficult. 79 Irreconcilable differences have been iden-

court to reverse a district court's findings of fact only if the appellate court determines that the
findings were not supported by substantial evidence. See Getz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of
United States, 90 N.M. 195, 561 P.2d 468 (N.M.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
73. Cole, supra note 64, at 559.
74. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 177, 812 P.2d at 1325.
75. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1992); id. § 40-3-8(B).
76. Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 36 (1966).
77. 1933 N.M. Laws ch. 54, § 1(8) (amending 1901 N.M. Laws ch. 62, § 22).
78. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1(A) states:
Dissolution of marriage.
On the petition of either party to a marriage, a district court may decree a
dissolution of marriage on any of the following grounds:
A. incompatibility;
B. cruel and inhumane treatment;
C. adultery; or
D. abandonment.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1992). Although New Mexico offers alternatives to
incompatibility as grounds for divorce, once the issue of incompatibility is determined, a decree
must be entered. See infra text accompanying note 82. Thus, in practicality, the remaining grounds
play a diminished role to incompatibility.
79. The statute states: "Incompatibility exists when, because of discord or conflict of personalities,
the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship are destroyed preventing any reasonable expectation
of reconciliation." Id. § 40-4-2.
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tified as a major factor in determining incompatibility. 80 Nevertheless,
"a husband or wife may secure a divorce for incompatibility regardless
of whether either, both, or neither were at fault.""' Additionally, once
incompatibility is determined to exist, discretion on the part of the judge
no longer plays a role in his decision to grant a divorce. 82 Furthermore,
the finding of incompatibility eliminates the right of either party
to
83
interject any notions of fault, because fault is of no significance.
Also, New Mexico is one of the nine community property states. s4 Its
statute defines community property as "property acquired by either or
both spouses during marriage which is not separate property. ' ' 85 Upon
dissolution of marriage, community property is to be divided as equally
as possible.8 6 Community
property is to be divided fifty-fifty, without
87
regard to fault.
Accordingly, it is inconsistent to join an action for an intentional tort,
specifically the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, with
a no-fault divorce. New Mexico's no-fault divorce statute and rules of
88
community property division preclude inquiry into fault in the marriage.
Yet an action for an intentional tort necessarily probes conduct in search
of fault. The bases of these two actions are simply inharmonious.
The Hakkila court addressed this inherent incompatibility of the joinder
of the two claims. Although Judge Hartz, writing the opinion of the
court, limited his discussion of this topic, the concurrence addressed this
matter more thoroughly. 9 Judge Donnelly recognized that "[tihe problems
are compounded where a jury trial is demanded in the trial of the tort
claim and where the action for dissolution of marriage also involves a
claim of alimony." 9 The concurrence also pointed out that in this
particular case, the alimony award appeared to duplicate in part the
compensatory damage award for the tort claim. 91 A tort claim may result

80. See State ex rel. DuBois v. Ryan, 85 N.M. 575, 577, 514 P.2d 851, 853 (1973).
81. Id.
82. Garner v. Garner, 85 N.M. 324, 512 P.2d 84 (1973). "Our Legislature, acting properly
within its powers, has established 'incompatibility' as a ground for divorce and .. . once such a
finding is made that it exists, a divorce decree must be entered." Id. at 327, 512 P.2d at 87.
83. DuBois, 85 N.M. at 577, 514 P.2d at 853.
84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1992). The remaining eight community property
states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 15A
Am. JUR. 2D, Community Property, §§ 1-115 (1978).
85. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1992).
86. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 104 N.M. 205, 215, 719 P.2d 432, 442 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
104 N.M. 84, 717 P.2d 60 (1986).
87. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 178, 812 P.2d at 1326 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(B) (Repl.
Pamp. 1989)).
88. Id. at 177-78, 812 P.2d at 1325-26.
89. Id. at 182-83, 812 P.2d at 1330-31. Interestingly, Judge Chavez concurred with Judge
Donnelly's opinion rather than the majority opinion written by Judge Hartz. Thus, the concurrence
has the effect of the majority. The majority and concurrence are fundamentally the same, with
slight deviations primarily in Judge Donnelly's stress on the incompatibility of the joinder of the
two suits and the procedure involved.
90. Id. at 182, 812 P.2d at 1330.
91. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

in the award of compensatory damages which collide with the marriage
dissolution settlement. 92 The Hakkila case illustrates the overlapping of
the awards of alimony and compensatory damages. 9 A solution to this

dilemma may lie in a bifurcation of the tort claim and the divorce
proceeding. 94

3. Procedural Problems
Judge Donnelly suggested that the solution to the problem of bringing

the two actions in one suit is bifurcation of the claims. 9 Acknowledging

that the rules of civil procedure provide for compulsory and permissive

joinder of claims,9 the concurrence perceived the joinder of a tort claim
with an action for dissolution of marriage as permissible.9 Yet the rules
also provide for separate trials through the bifurcation of claims. 9 The
concurrence also cited the Colorado approach in handling the tort of
emotional distress arising out of the conduct within a marriage. 99 The
Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that "sound policy considerations
preclude either permissive or compulsory joinder of interspousal tort
claims, or non-related contract claims, with dissolution of marriage pro-

ceedings," and that bifurcation is necessary. 00
Although the filing of the tort claim separate from and after the divorce

proceeding will not likely produce res judicata,' 0° the conservative option
of filing a compulsory counterclaim is advised. After filing the coun-2
terclaim, the spouse should either note that bifurcation is preferred, 0

92. Id. If the tort claim and the divorce action are brought in one suit, the award of compensatory
damages may be confused with the award of alimony. The community property would have to be
divided prior to the award of damages for a tort claim to ensure that the spouse prevailing in the
tort action is not awarded damages from a portion of his or her own community property.
93. Id. The district court awarded the wife alimony of $1,050 per month based upon the court's
finding that this amount would meet the wife's economic needs. Id. Yet "[tlhe alimony award
appears to duplicate in part the compensatory damage award granted to wife on her claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. The district court also awarded the wife $5,000 for
future medical expenses and awarded damages for her loss of earnings during the marriage. Id.
Under community property law, however, the earnings of a spouse are presumed to be community
property. Id.

94. Id. at 183, 812 P.2d at 1331.
95. Id. (Donnelly, J., concurring).
96. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-013(A), (B), & 1-018(A).
97. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 181, 812 P.2d at 1329.
98. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-042(B).
99. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 181, 812 P.2d at 1329 (citing Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988)).
100. Simmons, 773 P.2d at 605.
101. New Mexico identifies the elements of res judicata as: (1) parties same or in privity; (2)
cause of action same; (3) final judgment; (4) on the merits. See Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux,
98 N.M. 690, 694, 652 P.2d 240, 244 (1982); Board of City Commissioners v. City of Las Vegas,
95 N.M. 387, 388, 622 P.2d 695, 696 (1980); C & H Constr. & Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank, 93
N.M. 150, 160, 597 P.2d 1190, 1200 (Ct. App. 1979). Under this test, the tort action will not
likely be barred for failure to bring it in the divorce proceeding because the two do not constitute
a convenient trial unit and the causes of action are not the same. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982).
102. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 183, 812 P.2d at 1331.
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or should seek a dismissal without prejudice and file later without fear
of res judicata.103 If faced with the uncertainty of potential res judicata
impact, the spouse should file the counterclaim.
If a spouse files for divorce and then later attempts to bring an
intentional tort action without previously having sought a bifurcation of
the claims, the party will not likely be troubled with issue preclusion.
Issues will likely escape collateral estoppel. 1°4 A concession of no-fault
in a divorce proceeding by the spouse initiating a tort action will not
shield the other spouse from liability because the issue of fault was not
actually litigated in the divorce proceeding. Thus, collateral estoppel does
not appear to be a problem if a tort claim arising out of the conduct
of a marriage is initiated subsequent to the divorce proceeding, regardless
of whether the party sought a bifurcation of the claims. 105 Nevertheless,
bifurcation of the claims appears to resolve many of the problems which
arise in bringing these two incompatible claims together.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the Hakkila court allowed for emotional distress claims to
be brought within the marital setting, it may have precluded future claims
with similar facts from recovery by barring recovery under these facts.
This may be inappropriate if the court based its conclusion upon its
version of facts as summarized in the husband's brief. Furthermore, the
court's confusing use of the facts may cause variant results in all intentional infliction of emotional distress actions which are on appeal.
Appellate opinions may follow the example of this case and feel free to
review the district court's findings of fact in addition to its own interpretation of these facts without reversing the former. Still, the court
eloquently introduced the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
into New Mexico while adhering to New Mexico courts' treatment of
this tort in other contexts.
HEATHER S. CALL

103. New Mexico courts have recognized an exception to the application of res judicata through

their adoption of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm)

OF JUDGMENTS

section 26, which allows the judge in

the first action to "expressly (reserve] the plaintiff's right to maintain the second action." Three
Rivers Land Co., 98 N.M. at 696, 652 P.2d at 246 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 26(l)(b) (1982)).

104. New Mexico identifies the elements of the modern approach to collateral estoppel as: (1)
non-mutual party or privity; (2) different cause of action; (3) issue actually determined in the first
suit; (4) issue necessarily determined in the first suit; (5) judgment/decision final in the first suit.
See Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
105. Dissolution of marriage, community property, and alimony may all be granted without inquiry
of fault and do not require actual litigation. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(B) (Cum. Supp. 1992); Brister v. Brister, 92 N.M. 711, 715, 594 P.2d
1167, 1171 (1979). Yet determination of child custody may require litigation of issues and the court
may issue some findings. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). These findings may
potentially have collateral estoppel impact upon a tort claim arising out of the marriage which is
litigated subsequent to the divorce and child custody proceedings. Thus, collateral estoppel escape
is not guaranteed.

